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The Law and Economics of 
Consumer Finance 
Richard Hynes, CoLLege of WiLLiam, and Mary, and 
Eric A, Posner, University of Chicago 
This survey of the law and economics of consumer finance discusses economic 
mode ls of consumer lending and evaluates the major consumer finance laws in light 
of them, We focus on usury laws; restrictions on creditor remedies, such as the ban 
on expansive security interests; bankruptcy law; limitations on third-party defenses, 
such as the holder-in-due-course doctrine; information disclosure rules, including 
the Truth in Lending Act; and antidi scrimination law, We also discuss the e mpirical 
literature, 
1. Introduction 
The law regulates consumer credit transactions much more heavily than 
noncredit transactions like the cash sale of a computer. Nearly anyone can 
sell computers to the public, but the creditor- bank, finance company, 
pawnshop, credit card issuer- is heavily regulated by federal and state 
agencies: licensed, inspected, and-less so now than in the recent past-
circumscribed by geographic, market, and product restrictions. I The com-
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helpful comments, and Steve Aase, Nick Patterson, and Scott Hesse ll for their valuable 
research assistance, Posner thanks the Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund and the Lynde 
and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for generous financial support. 
Send correspondence to: Richard Hynes, William & Mary Law School, PO, Box 
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I. A creditor may be an ordinary seller of goods, but to the ex tent that the seller 
offers the goods on credit, it is treated like any specialized creditor, and sellers of goods 
often subcontract to such speciali sts, 
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puter seller may offer any cash contract acceptable to the market, subject 
to some light restrictions imposed by federal and state law. The creditor 
may not choose a price that exceeds the relevant usury ceiling, or remedi al 
terms that are considered too burdensome by the law. The computer se ller 
is not required by law to explain what RAM is. The cred itor is required to 
explain what a finance charge is and to present information about credit 
terms in a stylized way that is supposed to ease comparison of the terms 
offered by different companies. 
In this survey of the law and economics of consumer finance, we 
describe and eva luate the main patterns of consumer finance regulation 
in the United States . We examine the state and federal laws that regu-
late consumer loans, including cash loans and loans that finance the pur-
chase of real estate and consumer goods. We focus on (I) price controls 
(usury laws), (2), restrictions on creditor remedies, (3), bankruptcy law, 
(4) limitations on the use of third-party defenses, (5), information di s-
closure rules, and (6) antidiscrimination law. We do not di scuss general 
doctrines of contract law that m'e applied to cash sales and credit trans-
actions alike, including the unconscionability doctrine; statutes and regu-
lations that apply to all consumer transactions, not just consumer credit 
transactions, such as laws that regulate advertising or warranties ; and laws 
that regulate the mm'ket as a whole, including licensing requirements for 
creditors, geographic and activity restrictions, and antitrust laws.
2 
The literature on the regulation of consumer credit is not as lively 
as it once was. Academic interest peaked in the 1970s and em'ly 1980s, 
and with the exception of work on consumer bankruptcy tailed off in 
the 1990s. Yet consumer credit remains a significant topic of public pol-
icy and a source of interesting and difficult questions. For poorly under-
stood reasons, the individual bankruptcy filing rate has risen rapidly since 
the 1970s, stimulating reform bills in Congress and generating significant 
attention in the media. The credit card industry has attracted a great deal 
of criticism for its aggressive marketing efforts, confusing credit terms, 
and high interest rates. Major retailers such as Sears are criticized for 
their efforts to persuade customers to reaffirm debts in bankruptcy. And 
controversy has swirled around the sale of credit insurance to low-income 
2. We also do not discuss public choice approaches to the law or consumer Ilnance; 
see, e.g., Boyes ( 1982), Buckley and Brinig (1996), Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison 
( 1989), Lelsou ( 1995), and Posner (1997). 
/ 
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borrowers, a practice that has generated considerable profits for creditors. 
These and similar issues deserve more attention from scholars than they 
have received. 
2. Models of Consumer Lending 
A. Lending in a Perfectly Competitive Market 
An individual , Debtor, seeks to borrow money in order to smooth con-
sumption over time. A firm , Creditor, otlers to lend money at a certain 
rate of interest. tn a perfectly competitive market the interest rate will 
retlect the time value of money, infl ation, and the ri sk of default. Debtor 
accepts the offer if the benefit, that is, the transformation of future wealth 
into current consumption, exceeds the interest rate. 
[f Debtor defaults on the loan, he is legally required to pay Creditor. 
If in fact Debtor does pay damages as a result of a lawsuit, or forfeits 
collateral of sutiicient value, there is no "default" in an economic sense, 
as Creditor is fully compensated . The problem for Creditor is that Debtor 
may be judgment proof as a result of both legal and nonlegal factors. The 
legal factors , to be di scussed more extensively below, include restrictions 
on the ability of Creditor to seize assets or future income in order to satisfy 
a judgment. Nonlegal factors include the difficulty of tracing Debtor if he 
flees the jurisdiction or goes into hiding, and collecting from Debtor if he 
simply does not ever earn enough money to pay otf the debt. 
Default might occur in a bad state of the world in which Debtor 
loses hi s job, hi s health, or a valuable asset. Risk-averse debtors want 
insurance against slIch bad states, and in addition to the usual forms of 
insurance, such as automobile and health, Debtor might purchase credit 
insurance, which would repay his debt to Creditor if he underwent cer-
tain hardships, such as unemployment, illness, di sability, or destruction 
of the collateral granted to Creditor. Debtor might al so obtain insurance 
from Creditor itself in the form of a commitment from Creditor to forgive 
missed payments if certain events occur. 3 Nonrecourse loans also reflect 
3. It is like ly that some lenders informally commit to forgive loans or at least 
mi ssed payments through their reputations. For example, Caplovitz (1967) describes a 
practi ce of many credit se llers of abstaining from legal action after mi ssed payments 
after using social networks to verify that the ir low-income consumers are unable to 
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this interest in insurance. Debtor allows Creditor to seize certain collat-
eral upon default, but Creditor g ives up the ri ght to seek repayment from 
Debtor's other assets. 
Consumer loans take many different forms. The basic elements are 
the advance of cash (or goods) and the obligation to repay principal and 
interest in installments or in the form of a single payment later in time. 
Variations include open-end credit card transactions in which the debt can 
be deferred upon the payment of a small amount and monthly accounts 
at grocers and other loca l business. Consumer loans are often secured: 
there are home equity loans, payday loans secured by the nex t paycheck, 
pawnshop loans secured by pledged goods, loans secured by stock, and 
so forth. Secured loans may also be di sgui sed as other transactions, such 
as conditional sales or leases. 
A debate has raged on and otf about why secured credit ex ists.4 Cred-
itors should be indifferent in choosing between issuing a risky unsecured 
loan with a high inte rest rate and a relatively safe secured loan with a 
lower interest rate. Debtors should be indifferent in choosing between 
an additional cl aim on their assets and a higher interest rate. Therefore, 
because issuing secured rathe r than unsecured credi t involves additional 
administrative costs, secured credit should not ex ist. Two simple none1'-
ficiency explanations for the ex istence of secured cred it are that security 
interests are used for transferring risk to tort and other nonadj usting unse-
cured creditors and that, in the consumer finance context, security interests 
may be used to circumvent property exemption laws (White, J 984). Effi-
ciency explanations for secured credit are beyond the scope of thi s article, 
although we note below where they are relevant to the law of consumer 
finance. 
B. Monopoly Power 
Credit markets vary in their degree of concentration. Credit card and 
mortgage lending are nationa l markets involvi ng a large number of par-
ticipants who are unlike ly to have much market power (DeMuth , 1986; 
repay. A commitment to forgive the loan upon the occurrence of certain events is 
identica l to cred it insurance underwritten by Creditor. 
4. For early arti c les presenting most of the basic arguments, see Jackson and 
Kronman ( 1979), and Schwartz ( 198 1), Scott (1977; 1979), Sm ith and Warner ( 1979). 
For more recent treatment of the topic, see Bebchuck and Fried ( 1996), Hudson ( 1995), 
or see Scott, et al. ( 1994). 
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Elliehausen and Wolken , 1990; Pierce, 1991 ; Sulli van, 1984), but there 
may be loca l monopolies in certain areas of the country, perhaps poor 
neighborhoods, perhaps the result of regulations that rai se the cost of 
entering the credit market. The ex istence of such concentrated credit mar-
kets, or the be lief that such markets ex ist, has inspi red much legal regu-
lation. 
In an environment with full or symmetric information, a creditor with 
monopoly power will charge an interest rate that is higher than that avail -
able in a perfectly competitive market but will supply nearly the same 
nonprice terms as a creditor in a perfectly competitive market (Schwartz, 
1977). Harsh non price terms are unattractive because consumers will pay 
more for etli cient terms, and the creditor can use its market power to 
extract the surplus. The nonprice terms in the monopoli stic market will 
not be identi cal to the nonprice terms in a competitive market-because 
the monopoli st lends less in equilibrium, the optimal terms of the con-
tract may diner- but there is no reason to beli eve that the contract terms 
in the monopoli zed market would be harsher than the contract terms in 
the competitive market. And there is no reason to believe that forcing 
monopoli sts to suppl y some of the terms that wou ld prevail in a competi-
tive market wou ld produce a gain. Because the monopoly power remains, 
further di stortions wou ld occur in the unregulated terms (Schwartz, 1977). 
Monopoly power can have other effects as well , but these require asym-
metric information and thus will be discussed below. 
C. Asymmetric Information: Debtor Ignorance 
Even if there are numerous lenders in a market, each lender may have 
some degree of market power because of the inability of consumers to 
costl essly compare prices and terms. Depending on the source of the 
information failure, this may result in either an abnormally high price 
or abnormall y harsh terms. Some creditors wi ll lend only to those con-
sumers who are unable to compare the (price or nonprice) terms of the 
loan offered with the terms avai lable elsewhere in the market. 
The problem req ui res that a large enough number of consumers find it 
ditli cult to shop around. The competitive outcome would occur if a sig-
nificant subset of the consumers became informed and if creditors were 
unable to di scriminate between these debtors and uninformed debtors 
by, for example, offering loans with different terms and interest rates 
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(Schwartz and Wilde, 1979, 1983). That is, if enough consumers compare 
loans before borrowing, no lender can make a profit by lending only to 
those who did not compare. in tension with this optimistic conclusion is 
the insufficient incentive on the part of debtors to shop around when doing 
so confers a positive externality on the uninformed. 
The creditor wou ld seem to have every incentive to di stingui sh itself 
from its competitors if it is able to offer credit on more attractive terms. 
However, it cannot overcome consumer ignorance (possibly resulting from 
mi sleading claims made by riva ls) when that ignorance is severe enough, 
and the nonmonopoli st cred itor has insuffici ent incentive to educate con-
sumers because of that creditor's inability to internalize all of the ga in 
from that information. This problem is lessened somewhat if the creditor 
has market power. However, a cred itor with market power may have an 
incenti ve to provide too little information in order to aid in price discrim-
ination (Beales, Craswell , and Salop, 198 1 a). Furthermore, creditors will 
have insufficient incentive to explain the economics of the cred it market 
and the meaning of contract terms, because they cannot prevent people 
who have benefi ted from their explanations from seeking loans elsewhere 
(Beales, Craswel l, and Salop, 198 1 b). 
It is possible for third parties, such as trade associations and indepen-
dent groups like Consumers Union, to provide comparisons or standards 
for comparison. However, each of these solutions has its own problems. 
An independent group such as Consumers Union might supply too little 
information because it would have difficulty preventing consumers from 
sharing the information with others who do not pay Consumers Union for 
it. Trade associations may have an incentive to create standards or report 
information that favors those within the association over other competitors, 
or, conversely, to avoid creating standards for fear of drawing the atten-
tion of antitrust regulators (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981 b; Schwartz 
and Wilde, 1977). 
D. Asymmetric Information: Creditor Ignorance 
A different information asymmetry occurs when Debtor, rather than 
Creditor, has private information. Debtor could have private information 
about hi s Willingness to pay for credit, hi s propensity to defaul t, and-
after the loan is advanced- the care with which he deals with financial 
risk. 
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Let us start with the case in which Debtor has private information about 
hi s willingness to pay fo r credi t. ff Credi tor has a monopoly, it has an 
incenti ve to di scover Debtor's valuati on so that it can pri ce di scriminate . It 
is poss ible that Creditor can separate higher- and lower-valuation debtors 
by offe ring contracts with ineffi c ient terms. For example, Credi tor might 
offer a loan with a high interest rate and a loan with a coll ate ral require-
ment but a lower interest rate if thi s would help it di stingui sh between 
those who are particul arl y sensitive to the interest rate and those who are 
not. The effi ciency implicati ons of thi s practice are obscure. So long as the 
monopoly remains intact, a law that prohibi ts the ineffi c ient term will both 
elimi nate the cost assoc iated wi th the term and reduce va lue by interfe r-
ing with price discri minat ion. Cred itor will offer an average interest rate 
that dri ves low-va luati on debtors out o f the market (Craswe ll , 1995). 
Another form of information asym metry occurs when Debtor knows 
the probability of defaul t and Creditor does not. Ass ume that, because 
of personal characteri stics unobservable to credi tors, some debtors have a 
high probabili ty of de faul t ("bad" debtors) and others have a low probabil-
ity of default ("good" debtors) . Creditors that can distingui sh debtors by 
type obtain a competitive advantage, so a debtor's credi t record is valuable 
information, but further investi gati on into the debtor's personal hi story is 
not li ke ly to be cost justified, espec ially fo r loans of small value. For 
thi s reason, cred itors might try to flu sh out the types by offering diffe r-
ent sets of credi t terms that appeal to the diffe rent types. Harsh remedial 
terms are more costl y for bad debtors than for good debtors, because the 
bad debtors are more li kely to de faul t and thus to become subject to the 
terms. If credi tors believe that any debtor who fa il s to g rant a security 
interest (or who fail s to agree to some other harsh remedial term such as 
a cognov it c lause) is a bad debtor, creditors may offer two contracts : a 
secured loan with a low interest rate and an unsecured loan with a high 
interest rate.5 The good debtors e ffecti ve ly "s ignal" their type by choosing 
the secured loan with the low interest rate, whereas the bad debtors choose 
the unsecured loan. The cred itors' beliefs are validated in thi s sepm·ating 
5. Creditor might also be able to determine the type of the debtor through the size 
or the loan requested (Freixas and Laffont, 1990). 
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equilibrium. This would be true regardl ess of whether the market is com-
petitive or monopo li stic (Aghion and Hermalin , 1990; Rea, 1984).6 
A rule banning security interests and other harsh remedial terms would 
be effi c ient if the tota l costs of the signaling exceed the total gains. If 
there is no credit rati oning and no effect on the debtor's efforts to avo id 
default (we di scuss both these assumptions below), the reduced in terest 
rate charged to the good debtors should be roughly offset by the increased 
interest rate charged to the bad debtors. In fact, it is possible that banning 
such signaling would even bene/it the good debtors. The reason is that the 
good debtors might pre fer a contract with no collateral and with an interest 
rate that refl ected the average probabili ty of de fault in the popul ation, 
compared to a contract with co llateral and a lower interest rate. In the 
absence o f a legal ban on security interests, Creditor would not offer the 
e ffi c ient pooling co ntract, because of its be lief in equilibrium that good 
debtors issue security interests and bad debtors refu se to issue security 
interests. 
That security interests and other consensual creditor remedi es can be 
used to signal information about debtors does not necessarily mean that 
they should be banned, because this signaling may playa role in reduc-
ing a related problem caused by asy mmetric information, credit rationing 
(Betser, 1985, 1987). C reditor sets the interest rate to re fl ect the average 
probability o f default in hi s portfo lio. Assume that good debtors are less 
willing to pay a higher interest rate, because they are more likely to repay 
the loan.7 If C reditor cannot di stingui sh among debtors, the expected profi t 
fro m any particul ar loan will decline as the interest rate ri ses beyond some 
point, because as the interest rate increases the good debtors drop out 
o f the market. Therefore, creditors (monopoli stic or competiti ve) will not 
raise inte rest rates above this point, and credit will be rationed: the demand 
by bad debtors for (even hi gh-interest) loans will be unmet (Stig litz and 
We iss, 198 1). If there are too many bad debtors in the market, their proba-
bility o f default is sutlic ientl y high, and if the divergence in the probability 
G. If one imposes stronger assumptions, one can show that a monopoli st will behave 
diffe rently than a lender in a competitive market. For example, Besanko and Thakor 
(1 987) show that under certain conditions a monopolist is more likely to prel'cr credit 
rati oning over collateral. 
7. The assulllPti on that the good debtors are more likely to drop out of the market 
as the interes t rate ri ses is standard, but not uni versal. For an article assuming the 
contrary, see Besanko and Thakor (1987). 
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of default is too large, the market unravels, leaving only the bad debtors 
willing to borrow but creditors unwilling to lend to them. This is the 
phenomenon of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). Security interests and 
related terms may reduce adverse selection by enabling the creditor to 
distinguish among good and bad debtors. Security interests and similar 
terms can serve as signals because they are cheaper for debtors who are 
less likely to default. 
Credit rationing can also resu lt if there is asymmetric information about 
whether or not the debtor "can" repay a loan (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). 
That is, debtors may have an incentive to claim destitution in order to 
avoid repayment, and it may be difficult for creditors or courts to verify 
this claim. In an extreme case, the only mechanism that the creditor may 
use to force repayment is to deny future credit (Allen, 1983). Collateral 
with personal value to the debtor and other forms of creditor remedies 
ensure that a defaulting debtor cannot in fact repay if the debtor would 
rather repay the loan than endure the "punishment" of repossession (Rea, 
1984; Scott, 1989). 
Another kind of asymmetric-information problem arises when Debtor 
has private information about the care with which he avoids default. 
"Care" can mean a lot of things: ( 1) working hard, so that he is not 
fired and deprived of an income to repay the loan ; (2), protecting assets 
or collateral so that they may be liquidated in case of default; (3), avoiding 
physical risks that might result in injury; or (4) avoiding ri sky investments. 
If Creditor cannot observe Debtor's level of care and penalize Debtor if 
he takes insufficient care, and if Debtor does not expect to repay the debt 
in full because of the legal and nonlegal factors mentioned above, then 
Debtor will take a suboptimal level of care. This is the problem of moral 
hazard. 
One response to this moral hazard is to prohibit, by contract, behav-
ior that increases risk. Many residential mortgage contracts, for example, 
include a covenant against using the property for commercial purposes. 
But this response really assumes away moral hazard by supposing that 
conduct is observable: when conduct is unobservable, it cannot be prohib-
ited by contract. The second response to moral hazard is to require Debtor 
to bear some of the cost of default, thus converting a debtor who might 
otherwise be fully judgment-proof into one who is partly judgment-proof. 
For example, requiring that personally valuable property be collateral 
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reduces the probability that Debtor will be able to protect it at the time 
of default through judic ial process. Alternatively, Creditor might seek to 
destroy Debtor's reputation by publicizing the default; to cause psychic 
harm by liquidating a guarantee from a loved one; or, in the case of loan 
sharks, to break bones. Even though these actions provide no direct ben-
efits to Creditor while conferring costs on Debtor, they may be efficient 
because they reduce moral hazard (Rea, 1984). 
3. Law 
A. Price Restrictions: Usury Laws 
Description. Every state has laws restricting the interest rate that can be 
charged for consumer loans; a sample of these restrictions is set forth in 
Table I . However, although the interest rate ceilings in some states are 
quite low, their effect on the credit market is likely to be limited. There 
are many reasons for thi s. First, federal law preempts state usury laws in 
a variety of cases, the most important being home equity loans, for which 
there is no federal interest rate ceiling. 8 Further, since the late I 970s, fed-
eral law has permitted federally insured state institutions to "export" the 
high interest rate ceilings of the states in which they are located, permit-
ting them to lend at high interest rates to debtors who reside in states with 
low ceilings (Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Servo 
Corp.). Second, state usury ceilings have long been riddled with excep-
tions for, among other things , small loans, retail installment loans, and 
loans issued by favored institutions like credit unions. Third, interest rate 
ceilings often understate their effective limits, the result of special rules 
for calculating interest rates when lenders compound, charge fees , give 
di scounts, and calculate balances in different ways. Fourth, remedies for 
violation of usury laws are frequently narrow (Alperin and Chase, 1986). 
Fifth, usury ceilings may be evaded in many ways-for example, by dis-
guising interest as part of the "price" of the good if sold on credit with a 
di scount for cash transactions, or by disguising a secured transaction as a 
lease with high rental payments and a low buy-out price (Peterson, 1983). 
Sixth, many usury ceilings are set at fixed interest rates, thereby lessening 
8. This was actually an incomplete preemption as the states were given the right to 
;;opt out" and 14 states did so (A lperin and Chase 1986). 
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Table 1. Restricti ons on Consumer Loan Contracts and Remedies for Default 
USlII'y Limit on Tenancy 
Contnlct Loans Homestead by the 
State (Unsecured $lO,()()O) Exemption Gal'nishment" Entirety 
A labama No limil 5,000 
A laska FRDR" + 5% 64,SOO $420/wk 
A ri zona No li mit 100,000 
Arkansas FRDR + 5% SOO (P' ) 
California 10% 50,000 
Colorado 45% 45,000 
Connecti cut 12% 75,000 (F) 75%/40 x FMW 
Delaware FRDR + 5% 5,000" 85 % X 
Florida 18% No limil' $ 500/w k X 
Georgia No limit 5,000 
Hawaii 12% 20,000 (F) A t least 80% X 
Idaho No limit 50,000 
Illi nois No li mit 7,500 85%/45 x FMW 
Indiana 2 1% 7,500 X 
Iowa U.S. bonds + 2 point s No li mit Varies by income 
Ka nsas 15% No limit 
Kentucky Lesser of 19% or FRDR + 4% 5,000 
Loui siana 12% 25 ,000 
Ma ine 18% 12,500 P 
Maryland S% 5,500 X 
Massachuscl1S No li mit 100,000 (F) 
Michigan 7% 3,500 (F) X 
Minnesota No limit 200,000 (F) 75%/40 x FMW 
Mi ss issippi Higher 01' 10% or FRDR + 5% 75,000 
M issouri Higher of 10 % or U.S. S,OOO 90% X 
bonds + 3 points 
Montana No li mit 100,000 
Nebraska 16% 12,500 85% 
Nevada No li mit 125 ,000 
New Hampshire No limit 30,000 (F) P 
New .J ersey 16% o (F) 90%/set by judge 
New M ex ico No l imit 30,000 (F) 75%/40 x FMW 
New York 16% 10,000 90% 
North Carolina Higher of 16% or T-bill 10,000 P X 
rale + 6% 
North Dakota l : bill rate + 5.5%, max. 80,000 75 %/40 x FMW 
not less than 7'Yo 
Ohio 8% 5,000 
Ok lahoma 18% No limit 
Oregon No limit 25,000 
Pennsy lvania No limit o (F) p X 
Rhode Island Higher or 2 1 % or T-bil l o (F) X 
rate + 9% 
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Table 1. Continued 
Usury Limit on Tenancy 
Contract Loans Homestead by the 
State (Unsecured $10,000) Exemption Garnishment' Entirety 
South Carolina 8.75'70 5,000 (F) P 
South Dakota No lim it No limit p 
Tennessee Lesser or Prime Rate + 4 pts. 
or 24% 5,000 
Texas 2 x T-bi II fur fi xed rate/ No li mi t (F) p 
18%- 24% 1'01' variable 
Utah No limit 20.000 
Vermont 12% 75 ,000 (F) X 
Vi rginia 12% 5,000 X 
Washi ngton Higher or 12% or T-bill 
rate + 4% 40,000 (F) 
West Virginia 18% 15,000 80%/30 x FMW 
Wisconsin 12% regular, 40,000 (F) 
6% compounding 
Wyoming 2 1% 10,000 X 
Note : Thi s lablt.! is inh!ndc.!u to convey a rough se il s\.! of lil t.! variation among slates: all Ihe figures an.:: 
subject 10 conditions that can hI.! found ill statut1!S and judicial lk:cisions. 
i.I Fcdl.!r~t1 law limits garni shment so that th e.! deh tor wi ll be able 10 kcc.::p the greall.! f of 75% of his t.!' lrni ngs 
and 30 lilll t.!S lh l! minimum wage. Stale law is morl! rt.!slriclivl! wht.!n! 1l 01l!u: thl.! pt.! n:l!lltage ilnd dollar limits 
refer 10 Ihl.! amount thaI the tk:btor is cllIitlcd to keep. Whc.:: n; tht.!rt! is a slash th l.! debtor is eJ1lith.::d [() kt.!(:p 
the llla ximulll of Iht.! two ligurt.!s, and II x FMW Illeans II tillll:s the ft.!d(: ral minimulll wage. "P" indicates 
that ga rni shnwnt is prohibited without til t: debtor's CO Il S(:1l1. 
b "FRDR" Jll t.!ans Fl:dcra l Res(: l' vt.! Discount Rat t!. 
C "F" meilns tha t thl.! slate perm its the use of the federa l cx..::mptions in bankruptcy, 13 U.S.C. 522(d): 
$ 16,150 for tho hOllles tead as of Jalluary I, 200 1 
dThe fi gur..:: r(: j'..:: rs 10 the wildcard (:xl: lllption . which c<tn bt: applk:d to any kind of property. 
e "No limit" means that thel\! is not a monetary limit on Ihl.! value or tht! reid l!stale that may be exempted: 
til !!!'t.! Illil y bl.! other limits. inc luding lolal acr..::age . 
thei r importance in periods of low inflation. Sti ll , usury ceilings have the-
OI'etical interest and historical sign ificance, and they continue to influence 
many ordinary lending practices. 
Effects. Usury laws are simply price controls and can be predicted to 
have many of the same effects: queuing, unsatisfied demand, and an ille-
gal market, loansharking. Unlike standard price controls, however, it is 
doubtfu l that usury laws lower the price of a loan, the interest rate, paid 
by any parti cu lar borrower. Because there are many alternative uses of 
capital , a ceiling on interest rates wi ll simply lead creditors to refuse to 
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lend to high-risk debtors and instead lend to lower-ri sk debtors at legal 
rates or to seek other investment options. To the extent that high inter-
est rates are the result of market power enjoyed by lenders, as a result 
of either monopoly power or search costs (Ordover and Wei ss, 1981), 
usury laws might be able to lower the rate charged to borrowers. But state 
and federal regulatory agencies di scourage excess ive concentration in the 
banking industry, and many consumer loan markets are now national in 
scope. [n addition, there is li tt le ev idence that consumers lack informa-
tion about interest rates, espec ially after the implementation of the Truth in 
Lending Act described below (Schwartz and Wilde, J 979). Even if lenders 
did have some monopoly power and the usury ceiling reduced the rates 
paid by some debtors, these ceilings would cause higher-risk debtors to 
be denied credit because cred itors would be unable to charge them higher 
rates, thus offsetti ng much, if not all , of the welfare gain. 
Ausubel ( 199 1) raises the poss ibility that interest rates on cred it cards 
are artificially high because of the irrationality of consumers. He argues 
that low-ri sk credit card users intend never to borrow and therefore do 
not consider the interest rate when choos ing among credit cards, whereas 
high-risk credit card users do consider the interest rate. Because creditors 
cannot di stinguish between low-risk and high-ri sk debtors, no creditor 
would lower its interest rate, because it would di sproportionately attract 
high-ri sk debtors. A limit on interest rates could therefore be welfare 
improving. However, Ausubel's thesi s is in tension with recent studies 
that have found that consumers are sensitive to interest rates (Gross and 
Souleles, 2000)9 
Some of the earl y empirical literature on usury did find that states with 
usury laws had lower average interest rates than states without them. lo But 
most of the literature found that usury laws result in a significant reduction 
in the access to credit for high-risk debtors. I I ]n fact, Villegas (1982, 1989) 
9. For a recent discussion of thi s controversy, see Zywicki (2000). 
10. See, fo r example, Greer ( 1973), Peterson ( 1979), Peterson and Ginsberg ( 1981), 
Shay ( 1973), and Wolkin and Navralil ( 1981). 
II. See, for example, Boyes and Roberts ( 198 1), Dunkel berg and DeMagistris 
( 1979), Greer (1975), Kawaja (1969), and Shay (1970). For studies finding no credit 
ration ing, see Eisenbeis and Murphy ( 1974), Goudzwaard ( 1968, 1969), and Peterson 
( 1983). This is consistent with studies of the mortgage credit market, which typically 
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finds that the entire decline in the average interest rate is attributable to the 
exclusion of these debtors from the market; the usury laws do not reduce 
the interest rate paid by any individual debtor. This result is unsurprising: 
the suppl y of loans should not be inelastic if capital can be used for 
other projects or in other jurisdictions. The only surprising thing about 
these findings is that, because usury laws are so easy to circumvent, it is 
di ffi cul t to beli eve that they have any impact on behavior. 
Usury laws have a long and significant hi story, are still important 
in many jurisdi ctions, especia ll y Islamic countries, and continue to res-
onate with the moral intuitions of many people. This has led scholars to 
suggest possible benign explanations for their popularity. First, a usury 
law may be a crude form of soc ial insurance in a jurisdiction that has 
poorl y developed capital markets closed to the outside world and an inef-
fi cient or nonexistent welfare system (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1998). 
If usury ceilings depressed the price of credit, the poor would be able 
to borrow more cheaply, and thi s might be effici ent if the poor have 
a suffi ciently higher marginal utility of money than the rich. From an 
ex ante perspective, an individual benefi ts from usury laws if his lower 
return when he has capital to spare in some future state of the world 
is offset by hi s lower borrowing costs when he needs to borrow in 
some alternative future state of the world. This argument is inconsis-
tent with the mobility of modern capital, and so has no application to 
modern conditions; significantl y, usury laws have been repealed in every 
industri ali zed nation except the U.S., Belgium, and France (Alperin and 
Chase, 1986), though a fairly restrictive usury law was enacted in Italy 
in 1996. 
Second, welfare laws create a moral hazard, and usury laws may there-
fore be needed precisely because they restrict access to credit. Because 
welfare laws reduce the consequences of default for the debtor by pro-
viding him with a minimum standard of living after his creditor employs 
all available remedies, the debtor will be willing to borrow to undertake 
find that restrictions on usury reduce the number of building permits, due to a reduc-
tion in home fi nancing. See Austin and Lindsley ( 1976), Boyes and Roberts ( 198 1), 
Crafton ( 1980), Ostas (1 976) and Robins ( 1974). But see McNulty ( 1980) and Rolnick, 
Graham, and Dahl ( 1975), who fi nd no significant effect on building permits but find 
a significant effect e ither on nonprice terms or on loan vo lume. 
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ri skier ventures (Posner, 1995).1 2 Usury ceilings prevent these high-ri sk 
loans and therefore reduce the negative consequences of the moral haz-
ard . This argument assumes that people benefit from welfare laws, and, 
unlike the first argument, that an e ffecti ve welfare system is in place. 
There is littl e stati sti cal evidence for these theories; they are intended 
to rationalize hi storical practice. 
B. Restrictions on Creditor Remedies 
Description. A confusing array of federal and state laws restrict the tools 
that creditors have traditionally used to force repayment, including the 
reporting of past consumer behavior and nonlegal mechanisms, such as 
contacting the debtor and third parti es to request repayment. I] Self-help 
can be effective: debtors repay loans in order to avoid unpleasant phone 
call s; threatening letters; humiliation in front of friends, employers, and 
family members ; and damage to their cred it reputat ions. 14 The Fair Debt 
Co llect ion Practi ces Act requires certain kinds of creditors to (1) verify 
the debt if the consumer challenges it; (2), refrain from threats and harass-
ment; (3) , refrain from publishing the names of defaulting debtors; and (4) 
refrain from misrepresentation of their legal rights, the consequences of 
nonpayment, and so forth (Alperin and Chase, 1986). Although the fed-
eral act does not directly apply to the cred itor that originated the loan, 
its restrictions may apply to the creditor's lawyers (Heintz v. Jenkins). In 
addition , some states app ly similar regulations to the original creditors as 
wel l. Accordingly, we di scuss these rules in thi s section rather than in the 
section, below, on third-party defenses . 
When se lf-help fail s, creditors often sue and obtain repayment through 
prejudgment ancl post judgment remeclies . Before judgment a creditor may 
12. A related argument pusits that usury laws prevent low-income debtors with a 
hi gh discuunt rate from burrowing against future welfare pay ments and that this credit 
rationing permits a society committed tu providing a minimum per-period welfare to 
do so al a lower cost (Avio, 1973). 
13. The Fai r Credit Reporting Act limits the reporting of bankruptcies by con-
sumcr report ing agencies to ten years and limits the reporting of most other adverse 
information to seven years. 
14. For example, early in the modern history of consumer credit, "small lenders 
relied un the profess ional services of the 'bawlerout,' a female employee who was 
ass igned the job of trapping the delinquent borrower before co-workers and famil y in 
oreler to browbeat him publicly for being a sorry deadbeat" (Calder, 1999). See also 
Rca (1 984). 
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be able to obtain a li en on the debtor's assets and to garni sh the debtor's 
wages, and these powers are usually suffic ient to obtain repay ment. How-
ever, prejudgment attachment and garnishment are now regulated in var-
ious ways by the state and federal governments; they are also subject 
to constitutional due process limitati ons. Garni shment, both prejudgment 
and post judgment, is heav ily restricted by federal law (roughl y to 25% of 
wages, but with many excepti ons), and some states have even more restric-
tive limits or prohibi t ga rni shment altogether. There are fewer restrictions 
on post judgment remedies; these usuall y involve the sheriff 's seizing and 
aucti oning off property, or (again) garni shment of wages, which remains 
heav il y restri cted even as a post judgment remedy. Post judgment seizure of 
property is signi fica ntl y curtailed by state (and federal) exemption laws, 
which limit the kind and amount of property (home equity, clothing, furni-
ture, pensions, and so forth) that can be seized in order to satisfy unpaid 
debts. A sample of property exemptions and garni shment limitations is 
provided in Table I . 
A creditor can improve its ability to collect by barga ining in advance 
for certain ri ghts. For example, a cognovi t note, in which the debtor essen-
ti all y binds himself to confess judgment if he defaults, rel ieves the cred-
itor of the trouble of prov ing its case in court. However, cognovit notes 
are ill egal in many contex ts (A lperin and Chase, 1986). By obtaining a 
security interest a creditor ga ins priority over unsecured creditors and, if 
the security interest is perfected, over creditors with later-in-time security 
interests in the same property. Because a secured creditor can seize much 
of the property that would otherwise be exempt under state or federal law, 
debtors and creditors can use security interests to e ffect ively waive many 
of the exemptions. In addition, the security interest may also allow the 
creditor to skip some of the steps in the judicial process, and even sk ip 
it altogether if the creditor can repossess the collateral without breaching 
the peace. At one time, creditors would obtain security interests in all the 
debtor's househo ld goods, even those that were not purchased from the 
creditors or with the credito rs' money. 
Today, however, secured consumer credit is heavil y regul ated. IS FTC 
regulations and some state laws forbid creditors to obtain nonpossessory 
15. Creditors may seek to avo id Illuch of this regulation and potenti all y adverse 
bankruptcy treatment by recharactcri zing the transaction as a lease or a rent -to-own 
transacti oll. 
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nonpurchase money security interests in household goods, although there 
are some exceptions. The bankruptcy code also permits debtors to nullify 
nonpurchase money liens on many of these same household goods. Some 
states provide the debtor a right to redeem the collateral for up to a year, 
even if the collateral has been so ld to a third party, and require the cred-
itor to obtain a court judgment before repossess ing collateral. Finally, a 
foreclosure on collateral wil l sometimes preclude the creditor from seek-
ing the remainder of the amount owed through a defi c iency judgment. 
Common law and state statutory rules granting a ri ght of redemption and 
prohibiting defic iency judgments are important forms of regulation of the 
home mortgage market. 
Many of these restri ctions are available in bankruptcy, but we discuss 
bankruptcy separately, below. 
EfFects. Critics argue that the strong contractual rights to repossess con-
sumer goods are ineffici ent because the repossessed property has minimal 
resale value for the cred itor but considerable personal value for the debtor; 
these remedies are used in order to coerce (Leff, 1970; Whitford , 1986). 
Although there is some ev idence that fire sales ex ist (assets are sometimes 
solei for less than their wholesale book value), other scholars argue that 
the perception that val ue is lost is based on a misunderstanding of the 
operation of markets: 16 It is unlikely that value would be destroyed, given 
the characteristics of the debtors and creditors and the abil ity to renegoti-
ate (Schwartz, 1983) and so long as creditors believe that a reputation for 
aggressive collecti on techniques might scare off debtors (Peterson, 1986). 
As we saw above, however, even collection mechanisms that are inefficient 
at the time of collection may be efficient ex ante precisely because they 
are "coercive." They can, in theory, reduce moral hazard by increasing the 
cost to the debtor from defaulting (Rea, 1984) and adverse selection by 
enabling the creditor to di stinguish among debtors by ri sk level (Bester, 
1985). (See generally Epstein , 1975; Scott, 1989.) Regardless, the restric-
tions on creditor collections generate costs for creditors, and creditors 
should pass these costs on to debtors in the form of higher interest rates or 
16. See Schuchman ( 1969), White ( 1982), Note ( 197 1), and Note (1975). Grau and 
Whitford (1978) show that. repossessions decl ined after Wisconsin enacted a statute 
that requ ired creditors to obtain a judgment before seizing collateral from a defaulting 
debtor. This result is entirely predictable, and, as they appear to acknowledge, they do 
not show that debtors are made better off by the law in an ex ante sense. 
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else deny access to credit, particularly for high ri sk debtors. Restri ctions 
on coerc ive creditor remedies in general, and exemptions in particular, are 
associated with higher interest rates and increased probabilities of denial 
of cred it. 17 The effects are more pronounced for low-income or low-asset 
debtors. 18 
As noted, exemptions do not directly affect the suppl y of secured credit, 
because creditors can obtain security interests in exempt assets and fore-
close on them if the debtor defaults . However, exemptions could indirectly 
affect the suppl y of secured credit , in either of two directions. On the one 
hand, because the value of exemptions is enhanced in bankruptcy as a 
result of lien waiver provisions and similar laws, more valuable exemp-
tions might lead to more bankruptcies. As the automatic stay and other 
bankruptcy rules interfere with security interests, more generous exemp-
tions could lead to less secured credit. On the other hand, these added 
bankruptcies or general defaults may make costly foreclosures less likely 
because the debtors are in a better position to make the payments on their 
secured loans out of future income after having the unsecured loans di s-
charged. The empirical ev idence is mixed. Although Berkowitz and Hynes 
( 1999) find a very small decrease in the rate of denial s and the interest 
rate on home mortgage loans in the face of larger homestead exemptions, 
Lin and White (200 I) found an increase in these vari ables . Regardless, to 
the extent that the exemptions inc rease the use of secured credit relative 
to unsecured cred it, the parties must go through the formality of obtain-
ing a security interest in order to make assets available for coll ection in 
case of defau lt, and that is an added cost. 
Limitations on cred itor remedies do provide some benefits to the debtor. 
These limits provide some insurance by protecting the debtor's income and 
17. See, for example, Barth, Gotlil', Manage, and Yezer ( 1983) and Greer ( 1974). 
See Gropp, Scholz, and White ( 1997) (examining the effect of the exemptions on 
credit markets generally) and Berkowitz and White (2000) (examining the effects of 
the exempti ons on the market for small bus iness loans). We note that Gropp, Schol l., 
and White ( 1997) use the same data set used by Villegas ( 1990) to investigate the 
effects of usury laws and restrictions on creditor co llect ions other than exemptions. A 
further study disentangling the e ffects of each of these restrictions would be useful. 
18. That exemption laws have a pronounced e lfect on debtors with few assets is 
somewhat of a puzzle as these debtors can exempt all their assets in almost any regime. 
For exarnple, Gropp, Scholz and White ( 1997) find a significant reduction in the access 
to credit for debtors with assets of less than $7,885 when the exemptions move from the 
merely large (exemptions between $25,400 and $70,400) to the unlimited exemptions. 
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assets when he is least well off. As noted, they may also prevent socially 
wasteful debt collection practices . But a defense of these laws has two 
predicates, both of them difficult to establi sh. First, the law should restrict 
remedies only if a market fa ilure prevents creditor from supplying reme-
dial terms that debtors wou ld be willing to pay for and prevents the debtor 
from using alternative form of protecti on, such as credit insurance. t9 The 
usual market failure arguments can be made, of course. Perhaps adverse 
selection explains why cred it con tracts rarely limit the creditor 's remedial 
ri ghts. But if the market has fail ed in thi s way, it is hard to understand 
why there is such a robust market in cred it insurance. 
Second, the defense assumes that the law does reflect debtors' prefer-
ences. But the variation of the law across states is too extreme to reflect 
plausible differences in debtors' ri sk preferences. For example, an individ-
ual can exempt only a few thousand dollars worth of assets in Alabama 
but a potentially unlimited amount of home equity in Florida. A study of 
exemption laws in alISO states over a 22-year period reveals no correla-
tion between the generos ity of exemptions and proxies for the demand for 
insurance (Posner, Hynes, and Malani , 200 I). 
The exemptions and the bankruptcy right to a di scharge may address 
another concern, that of creating a class of people who do not work 
because they cannot keep their income or the assets they purchase with it; 
thi s exp lanation is al so consistent with limitat ions on the ability of cred-
itors to contact (and an noy) a debtor's employer. Although cred itors and 
debtors have incentives to renegotiate ex post, renegotiations will occa-
sionally fail , because creditors want to maintain a reputat ion for tough-
ness or hope to flu sh out debtors who have concealed their assets. The 
hi story of debtors' pri son is ample ev idence. And as that hi story shows, 
a class of people immobili zed or even imprisoned for debt sits uneasi ly 
with mainstream political commitments in a democracy. 
To the ex tent that debtors can waive exemptions and other limitations 
on creditor remedies, these laws merely change the default rul e for collec-
ti ons upon dehlult. Rather than contracting for protection through credit 
insurance, nonrecourse loans, and other means, the debtor waives protec-
tions through security interests, cognovit notes, and the like. A compari-
son of the merits of the two default rules would require a deeper analysis 
19. We acknow ledge the crit ic isms of this market, where profits appear to be unusu-
ally high. 
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of the preferences of debtors , the costs of contracting, the enforcement 
of limitations on default planning, and other factors that are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
A number of studies try to determine if restrictions on creditor reme-
dies provide a net bendit or a net cost. The authors reason that if the 
restrictions are beneficia l, the increase in the interest rate demanded by 
the cred itors should be more than offset by the increased willingness to 
pay by the debtors. One should be able to verify thi s directly by sepa-
rately estimating suppl y and demand or indirectl y by observing the total 
quantity borrowed. The results of these studies are mixed. Barth, Cordes 
and Yezer ( 1986) find that, although statutes limiting defic iency judgments 
might provide a net benefit, legal restrictions on confess ions of judgment 
clauses, on garni shment, and on security interests in real property cre-
ate a net cost. Villegas (1990) find that restri ctions on security interests 
in personal property and on wage garni shment prov ide a net benefit but 
that prohibitions on wage assignment create a net cost. Relatedly, Greer 
(1974) and Peterson and Frew ( 1977) find that prohibitions against attor-
neys' fees and garnishment reduce the total borrowings. Gropp, Scholz, 
and White ( 1997) al so do not conduct an explicit compari son of the costs 
and benefits of the exemptions. However, they examine the etfect of the 
exemptions on the total quantity of cred it and find that the exemptions 
increase total borrowings by high-asset debtors but decrease total borrow-
ing by low-asset debtors . Therefore , following the logic of Villegas ( 1990), 
larger exemptions seem to provide a net benefit for high-asset debtors but 
provide net costs for low-asset debtors.2o 
Although these results are interesting, the tests are imperfect. The com-
parisons assume that lenders and borrowers (or at least some borrowers) 
are aware of the legal restrictions, can correctly predict their implications 
at the time of borrowing, and can adjust the contract in light of these 
factors. T hi s assumption is questionable if the market failure justi fying 
government intervention is that debtors underestimate the probability of 
default or that debtors lack information about the consequences of default. 
20. Schill ( 199 1) find s that the right o r redemption and Hiltide lic iancy judgment 
rule in the mortgage market ra ise mortgage interest rates by on ly a slnall amount and 
argues that this cost may be outweighed by other benelits. He does not examine the 
e ffec t of these rules on access to credit , however, and he does not empirica lly evaluate 
the benelits in add iti on to the costs . 
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Moreover, even if debtors are fully informed, a finding that total credit 
increases is not a necessary condition for determining that the laws are 
beneficia l. Debtors may be willing to accept lower borrowing levels as a 
price for increased insurance.21 In addition , involuntary creditors such as 
tort claimants cannot adjust to the laws by charging a high interest rate. 
Finally, the limits on creditor remedies may playa role similar to those of 
usury laws in discouraging high-risk loans undertaken as a result of the 
moral hazard created by social welfare laws (.Tackson, 1985). 
C. Bankruptcy 
Description. By tiling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the federal 
bankruptcy code, a debtor can protect all hi s future income from his 
cred itors, retain exempt property, preserve certain kinds of trust funds, 
including pensions, even when they are not exempt under non bankruptcy 
law, and delay the se izure of other assets through the automatic stay. A 
large consumer bankruptcy literature addresses issues such as the role of 
reaffirmations , the proper role of Chapter 13 , and the desirability of con-
tractual bankruptcy but a review of thi s literature is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 22 However, a brief overview of some of the empirical litera-
ture on bankruptcy is necessary for a proper understanding of the results 
discussed in section B. 
Eitec's. Whi le several studies cited find that restnctlOns on creditor 
remedies, including exemptions that apply in bankruptcy, affect the deci-
sion to borrow, there is li ttle evidence that these same restrictions affect 
the decision whether or not to repay. This is surpri sing because debtors 
in financial distress should be more aware of the law of collections than 
debtors applying for a loan , particularly if they have retained an attor-
ney. Likewise, creditors should not change their lending behaviors in 
response to exemptions unless the exemptions have a real effect on their 
expected 10sses .2J Unfortunately, good data on default and collections 
2 1. For an example of thi s, see Appendix. 
22. The law is frequent ly criticized for being too generous and intlexible. See, e.g., 
Adler, Polak, and Schwartz (2000), Wang and White (2000), and White (1998a; I 998b). 
For a recent survey of the consumer bankruptcy literature, see Kowalewski (2000). 
23. Of course credit rationing could lead to fewer bankruptcies in financial distress 
and thereby daillpen any effect that larger exemptions have on repayment rates. 
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are not available by state.24 The available evidence, based on bankruptcy 
data, suggests that exemptions do not significantly affect the filing rate 
(see below), and it is unlikely that exemptions substantially atrect repay-
ment rates in bankruptcy, g iven the minimal repayments that unsecured 
creditors actually receive (White 1987). 
Arguing that larger exemptions should make bankruptcy more attrac-
tive to debtors , many scholars have predicted that larger exemptions should 
increase bankruptcy filings . While White (1987) finds a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect, the effect is small , and virtually all other pub-
li shed studies have found either no statistically significant effect or even 
an etfect with the "wrong" sign.25 This result has been repeated in more 
recent studies that use panel data or quasi-experiments.26 
Because the literature was forced to compare the exemptions and the 
bankruptcy filing rate, its failure to find a strong positive correlation is 
less surprising than it appears. The majority of exemptions available in 
bankruptcy are also available to a debtor defaulting under state law and 
therefore, though the exemptions should make default relatively more 
att ractive than repayment, they do not necessarily make bankruptcy rela-
tively more attractive than defaulting under state law. The many debtors 
who have essentially zero assets file for bankruptcy in order to obtain 
the di scharge: these people should not fil e in greater numbers when 
exemptions increase. To establish a link between the exemptions and 
the bankruptcy filing rate, one might be able to invoke the lien waiver 
powers in the Bankruptcy Code, or the incentive to avoid the complex 
financial arrangements that must be undertaken by a debtor who funnel s 
all income into nonexempt assets. These are some of the ways in which 
24. Empirical studies of the effects of garnishment restrictions on the filing rate 
highlight the shortcomings of focusing on bankruptcy filings. These studies generally 
tind that states with laws that are more restrict ive of the ability of a creditor to garnIsh 
a debtor's wages have higher filing rates. See, for example, Apilado, Dauten, and Smith 
( 1978); Ellis (1998a) , and Heck ( 198 1). Although this effect could be due to higher 
repayment rates, it is more plausibly due to the ability of defaulting debtors to protect 
their future incomes without filing fo r bankruptcy. 
25. See, for example, Apilado, Dauten, and Smith ( 1978) (finding mixed results 
when testing for a link between exemptions and the filing rate before to the enactment 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978), PeterSon and Aoki ( 1984), and Shiers and 
Williamson ( 1987) . 
26. See Buckley and Brinig ( 1998), Weiss, Bhandari, and Robins (\996). But see 
Pomykala ( 1997) and Hynes (1998), finding significant positive effects. 
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the di scharge and exempti ons are complements, but they seem tenuous 
(Hynes, 1998). 
The failure to find a corre lati on between exemption levels and 
bankruptcy fi lings might also be due to an inappropriate use of aggregate 
data when testing a hypothes is about individual behavior.27 The exemp-
tions may have little e ffect on aggregate fil ing rates because they are 
relatively generous compared to the assets of most Americans, and 
the reduction in access to credit may mean that debtors in states with 
large exemptions are less li ke ly to e nd up in financial distress. 28 Although 
current work ing papers use individua l-level data to examine the filing 
deci sion , the ir results cannot read il y be interpreted as a test of the impact 
of exemption levels. These papers test whether debtors respond to the 
fi nancial incentives of bankruptcy more generall y, including the di s-
charge, rather than just the exemptions, and there fo re examine the effect 
o f the debtor's "benefit" from filin g. "Benefit" is de fin ed as the debt that 
can be di scharged less any assets above the exemption that the debtor 
would lose by fi li ng (Chakravarty and Rhee, 1999; Fay, Hurst, and White, 
1998). Even if the exemptions have no e ffect on the fi ling dec ision, the 
coefficient on "benefit" may still be s ignificant because househo lds with 
more debt fi le in order to obtain the di scharge. 
Several stud ies investigate whether the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
increased the fi ling rate and re lated act ions. 29 That statute instituted sev-
eral re form s that could have made bankruptcy more att ract ive (Domowitz 
and Eova ld i, 1993), and the bankruptcy fil ing rate increased markedly in 
the years that followed. Us ing time series econometri cs techniques, scho l-
ars have tri ed to di sentangle the effects o f thi s act from the significant 
27. Earl y scho lars attributed thi s " failure" to poss ible simultane ity bias; leg islatu res 
mi ght adopt smaller exemptions in response to higher filin g rmes. Peterson and Aok i 
( 1984), Shiers anci Williamson ( 1987). However, it is unc lear why thi s same bias would 
not have a signifi cant e ffec t on the slUdies of the credit market. A lthough we lack a 
good ex planation lo r a state's cho ice of exe mptions, one might be able to test thi s 
theory by using hi stori cal exemptions as an instrumenta l vari able . 
28. It is poss ib lc to co llec t data on loans made by lending institutions in each state. 
However, the importance of national lenders in the mortgage and credi t card industry 
makes it unli ke ly that such a va ri ab le would be hi ghly correlated w ith the de bt issued 
by residents of each state. 
29. Wh ile we will di scuss those arti cles d iscuss ing the decision to fi le, the interested 
reader may wish to consult those artic les discuss ing the e ffect o f the act on the choice 
be tween Chapters 7 and 13. See, for example, Oomow irz and Sartain ( 1999a, I 999b) . 
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macroeconomic effects of this time period. The majority of the early stud-
ies addressing this question did, in fact, estimate that the code played a 
significant role in increasing the bankruptcy fi ling rate.30 One difficulty 
with this literature, however, is that it requires a controversial assump-
tion regarding the treatment of married couples filing jointly, which was 
not permitted before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Domowitz and 
Eovaldi (1993) examine summary statistics presented in studies of actual 
filings to determine a range of values for the proper adjustment to the 
post-act filing rate. When they use the lowest value of thi s range, they 
estimate that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 increased the filing 
rate by 22%. However, this estimate is not statistically significant; one 
does not find a statistically significant result until one uses a value near 
the upper end of this range. One solution to the problem highlighted by 
Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) would be to measure the effect on defaults 
(as measured by loans charged off by banks) rather than bankruptcies. 
Another difficulty with examining the effect of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 is that there were three other major legal changes that 
occurred at about the same ti me. In 1977 the Supreme Court ruled that 
restrictions on advertisements by lawyers are an unconstitutional restric-
tion of free speech, thus increasing the spread of information about the 
advantages of filing for bankruptcy (Bates v. State Bar of Arizona). ]n 
1978 the Supreme Court ruled that the interest rate paid by a borrower 
on a loan from an out-of-state bank would be governed by the usury ceil-
ing of the state in which that bank was located (Marquette Nat'l Balik 
of Minneapolis v. First of Or/"laha Servo Corp.). This reduced the abili ty 
of a state to set effective interest rate ceilings and increased the number 
of high-interest, high-ri sk loans.31 Both of these events could have stimu-
lated bankruptcy filings independent of the effect of the 1978 Act. Finally, 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was passed in 1977. Although 
thi s act may have increased the default rate, it should have decreased the 
bankruptcy rate by enhancing the ability of debtors to avoid repayment 
without filing for bankruptcy. The fact that the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
30. See, for example, Boyes and Faith ( 1986), Peterson and Aoki ( 1984), and 
Shepard ( 1984). But see Bhandari and Weiss ( 1993). 
3 1. Ell is ( 1998b) does di scuss the relative impOrlance of interest rate ceilings and 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. However, if one uses state usury rates before 
1978, a more rigorous allempt at disentangling (he effects might be possible. 
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tices A~t may have had an effect on the bankruptcy rate that would have 
conflicted with the presumed effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and 
the other laws is yet another reason to examine the default rate rather 
than the bankruptcy rate. 
D. Third-Party Defenses 
De~·cription. When retailers sell products on credit, they frequently resell 
the debt to a third-party creditor. After this sale the buyer is obligated to 
make payments directly to the third-party creditor. Historically, this was 
true even if the contract between the buyer and the retail seller was vul-
nerable to legal challenge. If, for example, the buyer purchases defective 
goods from a subsequently judgment-proof seller, the buyer would not be 
able to use the seller's breach as a defense against the third-party creditor's 
claim for repayment of the loan and would have no remedy against the 
originql seller. This outcome was compelled by the holder in due course 
doctrine when the buyer signed a negotiable instrument, but it could eas-
ily be obtained contractually by adding a waiver-of-defense clause to a 
nonnegotiable instrument. The usefulness of these doctrines for third-party 
cred itors is now severely restricted by federal and state law (Alperin and 
Chase, 1986). 
Effects. The division of labor between seller and third-party creditor 
clearly has advantages. Each party can specialize in developing exper-
ti se in its own market. The third-party doctrines also enhance the ability 
of creditors to reduce region- or seller-specific ri sk by reselling the debt, 
sometimes in large pools as "securitized" assets. The existence of these 
advantages is supported by studies showing a reduction in the ability of 
retailers to obtain financing and in the ability of consumers to obtain credit 
in jurisdictions that were the first to ban the third-party doctrines (Rohner, 
1975). 
Opponents of the holder in due course and negotiability doctrines argue 
that the deep-pocketed financier can more cheaply bear the risk of breach 
by the seller than the buyer can and, further, that it can more cheaply 
monitor sellers and prevent them from breaching in the first place. When 
financiers have a continuing relationship with the seller, these conditions 
might be met. But if these conditions are met and the market is competi-
tive, then all three parties will voluntarily place the risk on the financier. 
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It is not necessary for the law to prohibit the parties from choosing alter-
native re lati onships, and indeed such a prohibi tion would reduce social 
welfare . 
The r~gulat i ons appear to be based on the assumption that the mar-
ket fa il s, perhaps because of pervasive consumer ignorance, and that 
the regulations compel the outcome that the parties would want. This 
argument assumes that consumers irrati onall y fail to update their beliefs 
about c redit practices, even though they appear to do so in cash sale 
contexts, where sell ers suppl y warranties (for example) in order to 
attract buyers. Although thi s is poss ible, it seems just as li kely that con-
sumers take advantage of the cost sav ings permitted by specialization and 
diversifi cation. 
E. Info rmation Disclosure 
Des(."ription. The Truth in Lending Act and related state and federal laws 
require creditors to provide credit informati on in a clear and consistent 
way. T hese laws appl y not just to the credi t contract itself, but to all com-
munications, such as advertisements, bill s, responses to billing inquiries, 
and credit reports. Although the Truth in Lending Act and the associated 
regu lations are complex and impose a number of obligations on credi -
tors, we will di scuss two of the primary elements of this act.32 First, this 
law requires lenders to clearl y present the "amount fi nanced," " fin ance 
charges," and "annual percentage rate" as calculated in a standardi zed 
manner. Second, the law requires that creditors taking a security interest 
in the debtor's home provide an explicit di sclosure of such security inter-
est and the debtor's ri ght to rescind the contract within three days (thi s 
right may be extended to three yem's if certai n di sclosure requirements are 
not met). The Truth in Lending Act provides for enforcement both by reg-
ulatory agenc ies and by borrowers who are given a private right of acti on 
(Alperin and Chase, 1986). 
Effects. The stated goals of the Truth in Lending Act are to increase 
economic stability, to enhance the abili ty of consumers to shop for attrac-
tive loan terms, and to prevent inaccurate and unfair billing. The fi rst of 
32. For example, the Tru th in Lending Act regulates the process of correcting billing 
errors, the credit card customer's liab ility fo r unauthori zed use of the card , and so forth . 
For reasons of space, we do not dea l with these and other restrictions. 
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these goals cannot be evaluated empirically and the last of these goals 
is similar to the prevention of fraud and hence beyond the scope of thi s 
paper. The second goal is largely consistent with the di scuss ion of infor-
mation failure presented above. The standardized calculations required by 
the act-the amount financed, the finance charge, and the interest rate-
are class ic examples of scoring systems and there is some evidence that 
the Truth in Lending Act increased consumer awareness of the terms cov-
ered by the act, particularly the annual percentage rate (Mandell, L 971; 
Brandt and Day, 1974; Day and Brandt, 1973; Shay and Schrober 1973). 
Unfortunately, there is also evidence that the beneficial effects of these 
laws in enabling consumers to better shop for attractive loans may have 
been limited to well-educated, affluent borrowers. (Brandt and Day, 1974; 
Day and Brandt, 1973; Deutcher, 1973; Mandell, 1971 ; Shay and Schober, 
1973 ; White and Munger, 1971). Moreover, a problem common to all scor-
ing systems is that firms are driven to emphasize the measured attribute 
at the expense of hard-to-measure attributes (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 
198 1 a, 198 1 b) . If consumers focus disproportionately on the interest rate, 
lenders have an incentive to compete over thi s term and provide less attrac-
tive collection terms or cut back on customer service. There is some evi-
dence of this phenomenon : borrower awareness of terms not covered by 
the Truth in Lending Act, such as the dollar amount of the finance charges, 
actually fell after its passage (Brandt and Day, 1974). 
The required di sclosure of the scores created by the Truth-in-Lending 
Act is more controversial. These scores are brand specific information 
and creditors should have sufficient incentive to disclose this informa-
tion in order to gain a competitive advantage. Government regulation 
may overcome a collective action problem if no single creditor would 
have the incentive to invest the resources to establish a credible standard. 
Although a period of mandatory di sclosure may be helpful in establishing 
the government-sponsored scoring system (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 
1981 b), any further period of mandatory di sclosure would seem unneces-
sary because typical stories of collective action problems stemming from 
brand-specific information are inapplicable.33 Of course, we have noted 
that creditors with market power may wish to conceal private information 
33. Securities law, for example, requires issuers of securities to reveal a great deal 
of financ ial and business information. A popular explanation for this requirement is that 
issuers fear that if they provided adequate information to their investors this information 
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in order to engage in price di scrimination , but no one has shown that the 
act has affected the ability of such creditors to price discriminate, if in 
fact there are such cred itors. 
The requirement that cred itors provide special disclosure (accompa-
nied by a ri ght o f rescission) bf any security interest taken in the home 
is a better example of mandated disclosure. Creditor obviously has no 
incenti ve to inform Debtor of the legal consequences of a security inter-
est and to di sc lose the ri ght of resc iss ion, and hi s competitors may have 
insu tlic ient incenti ve to di sclose them as well , as di scussed. We note, how-
ever, that the traditional argument fo r mandated disclosure would seem to 
encompass much broader di sc losure of the legal consequences of failing 
to pay a debt than what is required by the act. ]f debtors do not know 
about the effects of security interests, they are not li kely to know about 
the ho lder in due course doctrine or the ri ght of redemption. The diffi-
cu lty is that too much disclosure of technical information may overwhelm 
debtors and cause them to ignore it (compare Beales, Craswe ll , and Salop, 
198 1b). 
Critics o f the Truth in Lending Act have focused their criti cism on the 
di fficu lty of complyi ng with the law. In addition to the adm inistrative costs 
of compli ance, the Truth in Lending Act may have reduced the abili ty of 
creditors to col lect on bad loans, s ince a determined debtor can almost 
certainl y find some fault with the disclosure by the creditor (Rubin , 1991). 
Although there is limited survey ev idence that the difficulty in compliance 
has reduced creditors' willingness to adverti se and ri sk violation (A ngell , 
1971 ), we know of no studies assess ing the effect of thi s law on cred itors' 
willingness to lend. 
F. Antidiscrimination Laws 
Description. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids creditors to di s-
crim inate against applicants for home mortgage loans on the basis of 
race, co lor, re li gion, sex, national origin, or handicap or family status. 
The Equa l C redi t Opportunity Act (ECOA) forbids them to di scriminate 
agai nst app li cants for cred it generally on similar, though not identical 
grounds. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requires financial insti-
would a lso be revea led to the ir competitors, but all investors and issuers would be beller 
a ll if adequate information were revealed (Mahoney, 200 I). 
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tutions to report data on all of their applicants for home mortgages, 
including the race of the applicant. 
Perhaps the most significant antidiscrimination statute is, by its express 
terms, not an antidiscrimination statute at all. The Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA) requires the appropriate federal banking regulators to 
"encourage ... institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local com-
munities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound 
operation of such institutions." However, the CRA was largely justified 
on the grounds of perceived di scrimination and interpretations by regula-
tory agencies refer to the need to enhance credit availability for minority 
groups (Hylton and Rougeau, 1996). 
Effects. There is an extensive literature on the role of discrimination in 
lending markets and a full review is beyond the scope of this paper.34 
There is clear ev idence of historical discrimination in lending markets, 
often supported by overt government policy, but there is no consensus as 
to whether di scrimination still plays a significant role in credit markets, 
whether it plays a role in some credit markets like the mortgage market 
but not others, and whether such di scrimination that exists is based on 
animus or the use of race as a stati stical proxy for credit risk (Hylton 
and Rougeau, 1996, 1999; Swire, 1995).35 To understand the difficulty of 
evaluating the laws against di scrimination , suppose that discrimination is 
due to the use of proxies. On the one hand, a prohibition of the use of 
statistical di scrimination may force creditors to expend resources to try to 
di stinguish between debtors and may exacerbate asymmetric-information 
problems. On the other hand, stati stical discrimination may cause minori-
ties to underinvest in human capital and the development of a credit his-
tory, in anticipation of being denied credit on account of their race (Hylton 
and Rougeau, 1996). 
There have been few successful suits brought under either the FHA or 
the ECOA (Sw ire, 1995), and therefore there has not been much academic 
debate concerning these laws. By contrast, the CRA has been controver-
sial: many have argued that it is costly and ineffective. The CRA gener-
34. Good surveys can be found in Hylton and Rougeau ( 1996) and Swire ( 1995). 
35. Partly because of the data generated by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 
empirical studies of discriminatory lending foclls on the mortgage market rather than 
other segments of the credit market. 
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ates significant compliance costs only for those banks that have branches 
in low-income areas and thus may discourage large banks from serving 
low-income areas (Macey and Miller, 1995) and discourage the develop-
ment of small banks to serve low-income debtors (Hylton and Rougeau, 
1999). Hylton and Rougeau ( 1996, 1999) argue that the current enforce-
ment approach encourages hollow compliance in the form of loans to 
wealthy developers operating in low- income neighborhoods or agreements 
designed solely to appease politicians and political activists, and rent-
seeking behavior by politicians, interest groups, and even rival banks try-
ing to block bank mergers. Finally, Sch ill and Wachter ( 1995) argue that 
by targeting the location of the investment the CRA and related laws may 
encourage concentration of poverty in urban areas. 
In the end, there are plausible arguments for and against the CRA and 
its effects remain poorly understood. Commentators agree that the CRA ' 
needs substantial reform, but they disagree strongly as to the direction thi s 
reform should take with some calling for safe hm'bor provisions or a switch 
to a subsidy system and others call ing for more vigorous enforcement. 
4. Conclusion 
Regulation of the market for consumer credit provides a number of 
benefits to consumers. It gives them information about the terms and con-
sequences of the credit transaction, it provides them insurance against 
shocks, and it protects them from di scrimination. But a proper defense of 
consumer credit regulation must explain why the market would not supply 
these benefits if consumers are willing to pay for them. The availability 
of credit insurance, the many ways in which typical credit transactions 
trade orf between interest rate and ri sk, and the existence of information 
intermediaries all suggest that the market does respond to some degree to 
consumer demand for credit protections. 
Models that incorporate information asymmetry and market power have 
ambiguous implications for consumer credit regulation . Information prob-
lems do prevent markets from achieving the first best, and laws regulating 
the credit market can in theory increase social welfare. But it is difficult to 
determine whether the premises of the models are met in reality. Compli -
cating the analysis, the sensitivity of consumers and creditors to the law, 
whether because of irrationality or rational ignorance, is unclear. And it 
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is not clear how much the law wou ld inftuence the behavior of even a 
rational, well-informed consumer, given the many loopholes, the limited 
penalty structures, and the many ways in which creditors can evade the 
law and creditors and debtors can contract around it. 
Appendix 
This appendix sets forth a simple example of how a law that so lves a 
failure of the credit market could, in theory, result in a decline in total 
borrowing. 
Assume that there is a debtor with per-period utility UO where UI > 0 
and U" < 0 and a creditor that is ri sk neutral. Assume that the debtor 
makes a take-it-or- leave-it offer to the creditor to borrow some amount 
B. Assume further that the debtor has no first-period income and will 
have a second-period income of L with probability p and a second-period 
income of H with probability (I - p) . Assume that the debtor defaults if 
and only if second-period income equals L (the marginal do ll ar borrowed 
does not affect the probability of default) and that he is entitled to retain 
an amount E in default. Finally, in order to make the example as simple 
as possible, assume that neither the creditor nor the debtor discount future 
va lues . 
The cred itor must charge an interest rate (R) such that 
B = ( I - p)(BR) + peL - E) , B - peL - E) or R = --'--'---( I - p)B (I) 
The debtor will therefore maximize 
U(B) + (I - p)U(H - BR) + pUCE), or 
U(B) + pUce) + (I _ p)u( H _ (B -(~)~L p) E))). (2) 
Or, the debtor wi ll set 
UI(B) = UI(H _ (B - pel - E»)) . 
(I - p) (3) 
In this very simple example, the amount borrowed is always decreasing 
in the exemption. The reason is that the debtor seeks two things: low-
cost credit, and insurance. The lower exemption- which in thi s example 
is set by contract rather than by statute- reduces the cost of credit but 
a lso reduces the amount of insurance. [I' the latter etlect dominates (as in 
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thi s example), an optimal exemption results in less bargaining than a less 
generous exemption . Thi s example is deliberately contrived; it assumes 
that the pro bability of default is independent of the amount borrowed and 
on ly considers how the exemptions affect bOll'owing through a change in 
the interest rate . If a debtor is re luctant to borrow a certain amount because 
he may end up in a very painful de fault , the exemptions could increase 
borrowing by lessening that fear. This effect is not present here because a 
marg inal change in borrowing has no effect on the probabi li ty of default 
and never reduces consumption when the marginal utility of consumption 
is higher than it is in period one . A more general model would show that 
if both factors are considered , an increase in total borrowing is sufficient 
to show that a law is effi c ient but is not necessary. 
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